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Abstract. Individual decision making is described as a bistable dynamical system. It can
be inuenced by the environment represented by other individuals, public opinion, all kinds
of visual, oral and other information. We will study how the interaction of the individual
decision making with the environment results in various patterns of decision making in the
society.
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1 Decision theory
The theory of decision making intensively develops in relation with numerous applications in
business, economy, politics, medicine and so on [1], [2]. It deals with goal-directed behavior in
the presence of options [3]. It appeared in the middle of the last century at the intersection of
many dierent sciences, economy, psychology, statistics, neuroscience, and others. However
already in the end of the XVIII-th century Condorcet described the process of decision
making by a group of individuals suggesting several stages of this process [4]. Modern
decision theory also considers decision making as a stage process. In sequential models
there are several consecutive steps of decision making [5], [6]. In [7] the following stages
are suggested: identication of the problem, obtaining necessary information, production of
possible solutions, evaluation of such solutions, selection of a strategy for performance. In
non-sequential models, the stages can have a more complex relation including their cycling
[8].
The process of decision making consists in comparing two or several options to choose
the best of them according to some criteria. It implies some order in the set of decisions
and the possibility to compare them. For any two of them, decisions can be considered as
better, worth, or equal to each other. This relation should possess the property of transi-
tivity. Decision making is often associated with its utility in purpose of its maximization
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or satisfactoriness [9]. In individual decision making, the standard representation of the
problem is based on decision matrices where alternative choices are related to the states of
nature, that is to unknown extraneous factors [3]. Since the state of nature may not be
completely known, there is a scale of knowledge situation in decision making: certainty, risk,
uncertainty, ignorance [10].
Recent works on the theories of reasoning, judgment and decision making can be found in
[11]. Evolutionary aspects of decision making are discussed in [12]. Decision making under
constraints is studied in [13]. Mathematical theories of decision making are based on the
game theory [14], [15], [16] probability and, more generally, uncertainty theories [17], [18],
and on linear programming and optimization [19].
In this work we will consider decision making process as dynamical system where in-
dividual decision making is inuenced by his/her (=hir) environment. For the process of
individual decision making we will suppose that the problem is identied and its solution
consists of two alternatives. The individual possesses all or partial information necessary
for decision making, and the process of decision making consists of evaluation of possible
decisions with respect to their utility. Therefore we consider the standard stage approach
to decision making. However we concentrate mainly only on one of these steps, evaluation
of alternative decisions and we describe it as a bistable dynamical system. This means that
decision making process can be characterized by some continuous variables which measure
the likelihood to adopt one of possible decisions. If there are two stable decisions, then we
will describe this process with two variables p1 and p2 which we call the willingness to adopt
decision 1 and the willingness to adopt decision 2. These two variables compete with each
other, and if one of them is suciently large and another one is suciently small, then the
corresponding decision will be adopted.
Individual decision making can be inuenced by the environment which we understand in
a large sense. This can be other individuals, public opinion, all kinds of visual, oral and other
information got by the individual which can inuence hir decision. This can also be even
hir own physical conditions. The main goal of this work is to analyze how the interaction of
the individual decision making with the environment results in various patterns of decision
making in the society. In the next section we will introduce the model of individual decision
making, and in Section 3 we will study the interaction of individual decision making with
the environment. We will study how the groups of decided individuals expand in space,
and whether these groups are homogeneous with respect to the adopted decision or their
decisions can be dierent.
2 Individual decision making
2.1 Basic model of decision making
Consider an individual who is supposed to make a choice between two decisions. We intro-
duce some variables which characterize the individual with respect to these decisions. We
will call them the willingness to adopt decision 1 and the willingness to adopt decision 2.
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The corresponding variables are denoted by p1 and p2 respectively. If p1 > p2, then it is more
likely that the individual will adopt decision 1 and vice versa. However we need to describe
more precisely the process of decision making.
The process of decision making is a time evolution of the variables p1 and p2. They have
some initial values which depend on the personal experience of the individual and on the
actual situation. Then this process consists in comparing various arguments for and against
each decision and in the search for other arguments. During this process one of the variables
can increase and another one decrease until the dierence between them becomes suciently
large. At this moment, the decision becomes clear.
In the simplest case, the time evolution of the variables p1 and p2 can be described by
the system of two ordinary dierential equations:
dp1
dt
= k1p1U1;
dp2
dt
= k2p2U2; (2.1)
where U1 is the level of uncertainty for decision 1 and U2 for decision 2. We will understand
uncertainty here not in the same sense as it is usually accepted in the decision theory [3].
Uncertainty for decision 1 is some zone in the intellectual universe of the individual (mind)
related to decision 1, which is not yet conquered by the arguments for or against this decision.
We can compare it with resources which can be consumed by the willingness 1 in order
to produce more of it. Hence production of the willingness 1 is proportional to its value
multiplied by the value of uncertainty for decision 1. For example, if U1 = 0, there is no
uncertainty about decision 1 and, as a consequence, no new possible arguments in favor of
this decision or against it, then the willingness 1 will not change. It is similar for the second
equation of this system.
At the next stage of the construction of this model, we need to specify the values U1 and
U2. Let K be a measure of the whole intellectual zone related to decisions 1 and 2. K can be
qualied by any of the present theories of uncertainty, like theory of probability, plausibility,
possibility, belief, fuzzines, etc [18]. Then we will dene the levels of uncertainty as follows:
U1 = K   ap1   bp2; U2 = K   cp1   dp2: (2.2)
Hence uncertainty is what remains when we subtract the parts already occupied by decisions
1 and 2. Let us note that the coecients a and c, b and d can be dierent. The role of
the willingness 1 can be dierent in the evolution of itself and of the willingness 2. In the
expression for U1, the terms bp2 shows how willingness 2 acts on the evolution of willingness
1. These are arguments for decision 2 in the evolution of decision 1. We can interpret it as
arguments against decision 1. From this point of view, we have 4 types of arguments, for
and against decision 1 in the expression for U1, for and against decision 2 in the expression
for U2.
Thus, we obtain the closed system
dp1
dt
= k1p1(K   ap1   bp2); dp2
dt
= k2p2(K   cp1   dp2): (2.3)
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Though the analysis of this system is simple and well known, we will briey repeat it in the
next section from the point of view of decision making.
The model described above is related to the probabilistic theory of decision making [18].
Indeed, let p be the probability to take some decision. Then P =   ln p is a psychophysical
variable which can be described in terms of Procrastination. This \abulic-like" variable P
decreases with time with the rate proportional to the uncertainty U with respect to this
decision: dP=dt =  kU . This equation is similar to (2.1) in the case of one decision. Set
U = 1  ap. If a is small, then we get
dp
dt
 ke
 P
1 + ae P
:
This formula is similar to that of the discrete decision process in the Boltzmann machines
[18], where
P (p = 1) =
ke P
1 + ae P
:
Let us note that system (2.3) is also related to neural models of decision making [20], [21],
[22], [23], [24], [25]. Other dynamical systems of decision making are suggested in [26].
2.2 Mutually exclusive decisions and compromise
Without loss of generality we can set K = 1. Otherwise system (2.3) can be easily reduced
to this case. Its non-negative stationary points are as follows: E0 = (0; 0), E1 = (1=a; 0),
E2 = (0; 1=d) and E3 = (p
0
1; p
0
2), where p
0
1 and p
0
2 are solution of the system
ap1 + bp2 = 1; cp1 + dp2 = 1:
We will suppose that it has a positive solution.
The point E0 is always unstable, the points E1 and E2 are stable if
c > a; b > d: (2.4)
The point E3 is stable if
c < a; b < d: (2.5)
The rst condition in (2.4) means that the arguments against decision 2 are stronger than
the arguments for decision 1. Similarly, the second condition signies that the arguments
against decision 1 are stronger than those for decision 2. In the other words, the choice
is between against decision 1 and against decision 2. It is what is usually called to choose
between two bad decisions. In this case, the choice between them depends on the initial
condition.
If conditions (2.5) are satised, then arguments for decisions 1 and 2 are stronger than
against decisions 2 and 1. So we choose between two good decisions. However, in this case
the intermediate stationary point E3 with positive coordinates is stable. So the variables p1
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and p2 will converge to it. This stationary point corresponds to the compromise between
two decisions. Hence the compromise is possible when we choose between two good options
but not possible when we choose between two bad ones.
Further analysis of individual decision making on the basis on neural model dynamical
systems can be found in [20], [21], [22], [23].
2.3 Can two individuals reach agreement?
The model of individual decision making described above represents a system of two ordi-
nary dierential equations with bistable dynamics. In order to study the interaction of two
individuals, we will consider here a simplied model of individual decision making which
consists of a single equation with the bistable dynamics:
dq
dt
= f(q); (2.6)
where q is the variable which determines individual decision making, f(q) = aq(q q0)(1 q),
0 < q0 < 1. If the initial condition q(0) is greater than q0, then the solution will converge to
the stationary solution q = 1. If q(0) < q0, then it will converge to the stationary solution
q = 0. These two stable stationary solutions correspond to two decisions between which the
individual should make a choice.
Consider two individuals who can inuence the decision of each other. Then we obtain
the following system of equations for individuals 1 and 2:
dq1
dt
= f(q1) + k(q2   q1); (2.7)
dq2
dt
= f(q2) + k(q1   q2): (2.8)
Here q1 is the willingness of individual 1 and q2 of individual 2. The last terms in the
right-hand sides of these equations describe the mutual inuence of the individuals which is
proportional to the dierence between their willingness.
Stationary points of this system can be found from the following equations:
q2 =  1
k
f(q1) + q1; q1 =  1
k
f(q2) + q2: (2.9)
Let us consider two limiting cases of small and large k. If k is suciently small, then system
(2.7), (2.8) has four stable stationary points with non-negative coordinates. If k is suciently
large, then this system has only two stable stationary points.
Hence we can conclude that if the mutual inuence of the individuals is weak, then four
(stable) situations are possible: each of them remains with hir own decision or they have both
the same decisions (one of two stable decisions). The choice between these cases depends
on the initial values of willingness of the individuals. If their mutual inuence is strong,
then they will necessaryly have the same decision. Thus, under conditions considered in this
section two individuals can reach agreement but not a compromise.
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2.4 Individual in a hostile environment
Similar to the previous section, we will consider here a simplied model of individual decision
making. Suppose that the individual interacts with hir environment which can inuence hir
decision. We consider the reaction of the environment and the variable u which measures
this reaction. The reaction of the environment is produced as a response to the individual
decision making, and it also inuences the decision making. We obtain the system of two
ordinary dierential equations:
dq
dt
= aq(q   q0)(1  q) + ku; (2.10)
du
dt
= b(q   q0): (2.11)
Here a and b are some positive constants. The rst equation describes individual decision
making (cf. equation (2.6)) that is inuenced by the environment. The second equation
shows the reaction of the environment on decision making. We will suppose that initially
the reaction of environment is neutral, u(0) = 0. It becomes nonzero when the individual is
in the process of decision making. It increases in the absolute value when the willingness of
the individual goes away from the undecided state q = q0. If the coecient k is positive, then
the reaction of environment reinforces the decision of the individual, if k is negative, they
work in the opposite directions. We will call this last case the hostile environment because
it always acts against the decision of the individual. (see, e.g., [27]).
System (2.10), (2.11) describes the process of decision making in its interaction with
active environment. It has a unique stationary point u = 0; q = q0. If k < 0, then this
stationary point is unstable focus. The solution will oscillate with an increasing ampli-
tude. Hence individual will permanently change hir decision in the hostile environment until
other mechanisms will stop these oscillations. This case corresponds to so called unstable
\Buridan" decisions [3]. Social dynamics in a hostile environment has various applications
including obesity [28], [29] (see also [27]).
3 Propagation of decision
3.1 Model with mutual inuence of individuals
The model of individual decision making will allow us to study the formation or the prop-
agation of decisions in the society. Let us consider a space interval [0; L] where each point
corresponds to one individual. We consider a continuous limit of the model with a nite
number of individuals. For the individual located at the space point x we introduce the vari-
ables p1(x; t), p2(x; t) which characterize hir decision making. These variables are described
by a system similar to system (2.3):
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@p1
@t
= f1(p1)(1  ap1   bp2)  1p1; @p2
@t
= f2(p2)(1  cp1   dp2)  2p2: (3.1)
We consider here a more general case where the linear dependencies on p1 and p2 in the
right-hand sides of equations (2.1) are replaced by some functions f1(p1) and f2(p2), the last
terms describing gradual decay of willingness.
If the individuals can communicate and inuence decisions of other individuals, then
we need to take this new factor into account. We will consider here the case of mutually
exclusive decisions where the points E1 and E2 are stable and the point E3 is unstable. Then
we can introduce two types of individuals. The individuals of the rst type adopt decision
1, of the second type decision 2.
We impose an additional condition which species the moment when an individual adopts
hir decision. Let p1 be suciently close to 1=a (the value at the point E1) and less than it.
Similarly, p2 is close to 1=d and smaller than this value. When the solution (p1(x; t); p2(x; t))
converges to one of two stable stationary points, it reaches one of the two critical values. If
it is p1, then the individual belongs to the rst type, if p

2, then to the second type. Before
the decision is adopted, the type of the individual is not specied (undecided individuals).
Next, we suppose that individuals of type 1 produce some signals. We will denote their
level (concentration) by u1. Similarly u2 denotes the variable which characterizes signals
from the individuals of type 2. These signals should be in relation with decisions 1 and 2
and they can contain any type of visual, oral and other information which can be transmitted
between two individuals. We can write the following system of equations for the variables
u1 and u2:
@u1
@t
= D1
@2u1
@x2
+W1   1u1; (3.2)
@u2
@t
= D2
@2u2
@x2
+W2   2u2; (3.3)
where W1 and W2 are the rates of production of the corresponding signals, the last terms
describing their decay. Diusion terms in these equations describe diusion of signals (in-
formation). Similar to the usual molecular diusion, the ux of information is proportional
to the dierence of the signal level between the individuals who exchange information.
The variables u1 and u2 inuence individual decision making:
@p1
@t
= f1(p1)(1  ap1   bp2)  1p1 + b11u1 + b12u2; (3.4)
@p2
@t
= f2(p2)(1  cp1   dp2)  2p2 + b21u1 + b22u2: (3.5)
Let us note that in Section 2.3, where we consider the mutual inuence of two individuals,
they interacted directly through their willingness. The model of interaction by intermediate
of produced signals is more general.
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It remain to specify how the rates of production of the signals u1 and u2, respectively W1
and W2, depend on individual decision making. Consider a space point x and denote by t0
the minimal time for which p1(x; t0) = p

1 or p2(x; t0) = p

2. In the rst case we set
c1(x; t) =

0 ; t < t0
1 ; t  t0 ; c2(x; t) = 0;
while in the second case
c2(x; t) =

0 ; t < t0
1 ; t  t0 ; c1(x; t) = 0:
We can now dene W1 and W2:
W1 = 1c1; W2 = 2c2
with some 1; 2 > 0. Thus, if p1 reaches the critical value p

1 and p2 < p

2, the undecided
individual adopts the rst decision. After that he begins to produce signal u1. It occurs
similarly with the second decision.
We will consider the functions f1(p) and f2(p) in the following form:
f1(p) = k1p+ n1p
2; f2(p) = k2p+ n2p
2;
where k1; k2; n1; n2 are non-negative numbers. The case of linear functions corresponds to
the usual model of competition of species. We will see that behavior of solutions can be
essentially dierent for the quadratic dependence.
System (3.2)-(3.5) is a degenerate parabolic system with some of the diusion coecients
equal zero. Travelling wave solutions for some classes of degenerate parabolic systems are
studied in [30], [31], [32]. We will discuss below the modes of propagation of such waves.
We will observe propagation of simple waves with a constant solution behind the wave front
and periodic waves with a spatial structure behind the wave (cf. [33]).
In the next sections we present the results of numerical simulations of this model. We used
an implicit nite dierence approximation of the diusion operator with Thomas algorithm to
inverse the tridiagonal matrix. The nonlinear terms were taken explicitly (from the previous
time step). Accuracy of the simulations was veried by decreasing the space and time steps.
Let us note that this is a qualitative model, and the values of parameters are chosen to
illustrate dierent regimes of wave propagation. We will use the following values:
a = 0:5; b = 1; c = 1; d = 0:5; 1 = 2 = 0:1; 1 = 2 = 0:1; 1 = 2 = 0:1;
D1 = D2 = 0:1; p

1 = p

2 = 1:5
unless other values are indicated. The values of other parameters will be given in the
corresponding simulations.
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3.2 Do as the others
Behavior of solutions of this problem depends on the values of the coecients. We begin
with the case where b12 = b21 = 0, b11 and b22 are positive. Therefore the signal u1, produced
by individuals adopting decision 1, acts to reinforce decision 1. Similar for the signal u2. We
can interpret this case as doing similar to the others.
Figure 1: Snapshots of solution in three consecutive moments of time. Individuals of type 1
gradually ll the whole interval (c1 = 1, black curves). Their propagation is accompanied by
propagation of signal u1 (red curves) and of the internal variable p1 (violet curves). The values
of parameters are as follows: k1 = k2 = 0:5, n1 = n2 = 0; b11 = 0:1; b12 = 0; b21 = 0; b22 = 0:1
Let the initial distributions for p1, p2, u1 and u2 be identically zero. We introduce at
the left border of the interval individuals 1 (c1 = 1). They produce signal u1 which diuse,
initiate production of the variable p1 at the individual decision level. When this variable
reaches the critical level, the undecided individuals become individuals of type 1. They
produce signal u1 in their turn and so on. We observe propagation of a front wave where
individuals 1 gradually ll the whole interval (Figure 1). Individuals of type 2 do not appear
and the corresponding variables p2 and u2 remain zero. This is a reaction-diusion wave
similar to those observed in various models of population dynamics [32].
We recall that the evolution of willingness in equations (3.4), (3.5) is determined by its
production, by its decay (or dissipation) and by the external inuence. If the production of
willingness is not fast enough to compensate its dissipation, then the critical value p1, which
is necessary for the undecided individuals to adopt decision 1, may not be reached. Then we
observe a strange eect where the interval remains lled by the undecided individuals but
their willingness rises from 0 to some constant value (Figure 2, left).
We can give the following explanation of this behavior. Individuals of type 1 introduced
initially produce signal u1 which propagates and converges to an exponentially decaying
distribution. In spite of its fast decay, it is sucient to stimulate production of willingness
p1 everywhere in space. However, since the signal decays, the individuals located at greater
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Figure 2: Propagation of willingness in the case of doing as the others, k1 = k2 = 0:2,
n1 = n2 = 0; b11 = 0:1; b12 = 0; b21 = 0; b22 = 0:1 (left), and in the case of doing opposite
to the others b11 = 0; b12 = 0:1; b21 = 0:1; b22 = 0 (middle). If production of willingness is
faster, then individuals of type 2 appear and spread in space, k1 = k2 = 0:5, n1 = n2 = 0;
b11 = 0; b12 = 0:1; b21 = 0:1; b22 = 0 (right). The colors of the curves correspond to the colors
of the variables above the gures.
distance need more time to develop their willingness. Its value is not sucient to adopt
decision 1, and new individuals of type 1 do not appear. Formally, it looks like propagation
of the wave of willingness. It is important to note here that this eect is possible because
undecided individuals are unstable. In other words, the stationary point E00 is unstable,
and even a weak external signal leads to the growth of willingness.
This situation can be compared with propagation of rumors where people have not seen
the event (here, individuals of type 1) but they form an opinion about this event. This
opinion is not strong enough to adopt the corresponding decision.
Finally, if the coecients k1 and k2 are suciently small, then the rate of production of
willingness becomes even less than before, and the willingness will not propagate.
3.3 Do opposite to the others
In this section we will consider the case where b11 = b22 = 0 and b12; b21 are positive. This
means that the signal produced by individuals 1 stimulate decision 2 and vice versa. From
the point of view of individual decision making, we will interpret this case as doing the
opposite to the others. We will see that there are two dierent subcases here, with unstably
and stably undecided individuals.
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3.3.1 Unstably undecided individuals
We will begin with the case where the stationary point E00 of the individual decision making
system is unstable. We set n1 = n2 = 0 and k1, k2 are positive. Figure 2 (middle) shows
behavior similar to that described above where individuals of type one do not expand but
provide propagation of the willingness. In this case it is p2 instead of p1 because individuals
of type 1 stimulate production of willingness 2.
If we increase coecients k1 and k2, then willingness 2 reaches the critical value, and
individuals 2 are formed and expand in space (Figure 2, right). Hence, introduction of
individuals of type 1 leads to propagation of individuals of type 2. For all combinations of
parameters considered here, one of the individual types rapidly dominates another one and
propagates, lling the whole space interval.
Figure 3: In the case of doing opposite to the others and stably undecided individuals, a
periodic pattern appears behind the propagating wave. Both types of individuals emerge
and form clusters. A snapshot of solution: distributions of C (left), of p1; p2 (middle) and of
u1; u2 (right).
3.3.2 Stably undecided individuals
Another situation is observed if the stationary point E00 is stable. We now set k1 = k2 = 0
and n1, n2 are positive. Since the production terms are quadratic for small pi and decay
terms are linear, then the point is stable. Let us note that this case is also realistic because
individuals can possess some stability with respect to the external inuence on their decision.
We will present an example of numerical simulations where b11 = b22 = 0 and b12; b21 are
positive. This means that individuals of type 1 produce signal which stimulates decision 2
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Figure 4: Distribution of individuals behind the wave depends on parameters. It can contain
individuals of types 1 and 2 and also undecided individuals; q1 = q2 = 0:01 (left), q1 = q2 =
0:01, D2 = 0:5 (middle), q1 = 0:1; q2 = 0:01 (right).
and individuals of type 2 produce signal which stimulates decision 1 (Figure 3). Initially
all individuals are undecided (p1 = p2 = 0). We introduce individuals of type 1 at the left
side of the interval and observe a wave propagating from the left to the right. There is a
periodic structure behind the wave. Let us note that Figure 3 (left) shows the variable C
which takes three values: 0 if c1 = c2 = 0, 1 if c1 = 1; c2 = 0, 2 if c1 = 0; c2 = 1. Thus we
observe formation of clusters of individuals of types 1 and 2.
For other values of parameters the propagating patterns can be dierent. They can con-
tain both types of individuals together with undecided individuals (Figure 4, left). Moreover
their distribution depends on parameters (cf. Figure 4, right). Figure 4 (middle) shows a
pattern with two types of individuals which is dierent in comparison with Figure 3.
4 Discussion
The results of the work can help to understand certain aspects of social behavior in their
relation with the mechanisms of decision making. In particular, we formulate the conditions
of the coexistence of dierent decisions in the society. It has crucial importance in the
democratic societies. Moreover, we identify the relation between dierent types of social
behavior and individual neural networks.
Another possible application concerns expert systems. The anticipation in articial in-
telligence, notably in medical decision making, requires a consensus between several actors
(physician, patient, paramedics) and one of the reasons for the failure of medical expert sys-
tems is probably the lack of the modeling of the consensus process among the various players
in the medical decision. This process could be revisited with the quantication proposed in
this article, with a modeling of the mutual inuences between health strategy makers.
Individual decision making is a choice between two or several options. This choice can
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be inuenced by many external factors, and by other individuals with their opinions, for
example, appearance, public opinion, education, mass media and even physical conditions of
the individual. All these external factors can reinforce the decision of the individual or act
in the opposite way. Trying to follow these factors, the individual can change hir decision.
As in the example with weight loss, these changes can be repetitive.
Another aspect of the same question is whether the individual will follow the external
signal or will act contrary to it. The education process is mainly based on following some
other's example or pattern of behavior. These can be parents, tutors, friends. A similar
mechanism works for young animals who learn from their parents following them.
However, young children at certain age go further, they learn to do opposite. Once they
understand that they can refuse doing something, during some period of time they answer
\no" to everything. After some time this stage of learning by opposition is nished and their
behavior becomes more complex combining positive and negative decisions. The next period
of learning by opposition is teenager crisis. Learning by opposition can be an important
property of human mind. New ways are found by those who refuse to follow the old ones.
The results presented above show that individual making decision in opposition to re-
ceived signals can play an important role in the pattern of decisions. They make the decision
distribution possibly heterogeneous. This is related to the model of individual in a hostile
environment. In the other case, if individuals only follow received signals, there is always
one decision dominating the other one (in the framework of the considered models).
Preservation of plurality in decisions is of course very important, in particular for the ex-
istence of modern democracy which is based on the equilibrium of two opposing (though not
necessarily opposite) forces. There are many examples of coexistence of opposite decisions
in the society, such as smoking, obesity, and so on. If individuals with dierent decisions
already exist, then they can form clusters on the basis of their similarity [29]. However these
dierent groups will persist if individuals can oppose to suggested pattern and not only follow
it. Otherwise one of them will dominate and suppress another one. Propagation of obesity
is studied in [28]. If the individuals can change their decisions due to mutual interactions,
then the system can converge to a single equilibrium point where the two decisions coexist
[26].
Let us nish this work with the citation from Condorcet about individuals following
the opinion of the others: \Celui qui nit par se ranger au parti le plus nombreux, parle
certainement contre sa conscience. Puis donc qu'il ne faut pas que l'opinia^trete d'un seul
juge, qui peut e^tre gagne, interrompe le cours de la justice, il ne faut pas faire une loi de
l'unanimite" [34]. Thus, he wrote, we should not follow the majority against our convictions.
Unanimity in the decision should not make the law.
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